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EVIDENCE:
ENT

THE CRIME FRAUD EXCEPTION TO ATTORNEY-CLI-

PRIVILEGE-United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (in-

terim ed. 1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

[T]he difficulty has been to define the boundaries of [the crime-fraud]
limitation. It has not always been kept in mind that the privilege, in its
very fundamentals, presupposes . . . the furnishing of legal advice to the
culpable client, as well as to the worthy one.'

The attorney-client privilege traditionally protects confidential
communications between a client and his attorney.' It is the oldest of
the privileges for confidential communications, dating back to the reign
of Elizabeth I.1 However, commentators have long recognized that the
privilege ceases to exist when the attorney's advice is used to assist in
the commission of a crime or fraud. This cessation of privilege has
come to be known as the crime-fraud exception.8
In the crime-fraud exception, the need for the
fact-finder to have
access to relevant information directly conflicts with the near-sanctity
accorded the attorney-client privilege. The conflict between the attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception has escalated in the
past two decades as over-burdened courts have struggled with the practical application and jurisprudential implications of this exception.' In
response to a proliferation of allegations of crime and fraud, courts

1. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A.J.
708, 708 (1961).
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290; Fried, Too High a Pricefor Truth: The Exception
to the Attorney-Client Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REV. 443, 445
(1986) (the crime-fraud exception dates back to at least 1743).
4. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER. FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 213 (1985); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2298; Fried, supra note 3, at 445; Gardner, supra note 2, at 708; Note, The Future
Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REV. 730, 730 (1964).

5. Gardner, supra note 2, at 708.
6. See Fried, supra note 3, at 445 (noting the extraordinary increase in attempts to compel
the testimony of attorneys in both criminal and civil cases); see also Stern & Hoffman, Privileged
Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783,
1787-89 (1988) (citing statistics released by the Department of Justice which indicate that the
department approved 400 requests to issue grand jury subpoenas to attorneys from July 18, 1985
to July 31, 1986). For further reading on this issue see Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1976) and Glanzer
& Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070 (1984).
7. See Fried, supra note 3, at 445 (the "temptation to gather evidence from the mouths of
the defendants' attorneys" has resulted from a great increase in prosecutions of business frauds
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have increasingly addressed the practical difficulties of proving the exception by lowering the evidentiary burden," allowing in camera re1
view 9 and rejecting the independent evidence requirement. In United
States v. Zolin," the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity
to consider the numerous problems created by the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. This casenote will examine the
sources of the privilege and exception, the Court's response to the
problems of proof and the impact that the Zolin decision may have on
the attorney-client privilege.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In the early 1970s, the Church of Scientology brought a civil suit
in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Gerald Armstrong, one
of its former members. 2 The complaint alleged, among other things,
that Armstrong had obtained certain documentary materials through
unlawful means, including taped conversations relating to Church activities. 1 3 In the course of the litigation the disputed documentary
materials were filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court."
In July 1984, the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal
Revenue Service began an investigation of the tax returns of L. Ron
Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology.1 5 The investigation focused on the period from 1979 through 1983.16 On October 24, 1984,
the IRS served a summons on the Clerk of the Superior Court, de-

and white-collar and organized crime with their inherently formidable problems of proof).
8. Courts have lowered the burden of proof to a prima facie showing of "foundation in
fact." Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). See, e.g., Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley,
P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo. 1982); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26,
32 (Colo. 1982).
9. In camera review occurs when a trial judge reviews a document which counsel wishes to
use at trial prior to a ruling on its admissibility. The review takes place either in the judge's
private chambers or when all spectators have been excluded from the courtroom. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See Fried, supra note 3, at 461-62 (the independent evidence requirement compels a
threshold showing of evidence which is independent of the contested communication itself, before
in camera review may be undertaken).
11. 109 S. Ct. 2619 (interim ed. 1989).
12. Id. at 2623.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2619. L. Ron Hubbard died on January 24, 1986, prompting the Church of
Scientology and Mary Sue Hubbard, respondents in Zolin, to suggest that any further criminal
investigation of Mr. Hubbard was foreclosed and that the IRS civil audit of him should be terminated. The Church of Scientology argued that the case before the Supreme Court was moot for
these reasons. The IRS, conversely, contended that the results of their civil audit could implicate
Mr. Hubbard's estate. The Supreme Court agreed with the IRS that the controversy remained to
be settled. Id. at 2623 n.3.
16. Id. at 2623.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/9
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manding production of forty-nine documents filed in the Armstrong
case, including the disputed documentary materials.17 The IRS agents
obtained and copied certain portions of the summoned materials."8
The Church obtained a temporary restraining order from the
United States District Court for the Central District of California compelling the IRS to file with the district court all of the materials acquired by summons from the superior court and all reproductions and
notes on the materials. 9 The Church also moved for a preliminary injunction in order to bar the IRS from using the disputed documentary
materials.2 0
The district court returned all the materials except the taped conversations to the IRS.2 ' The IRS then filed a petition to enforce its
summons on January 18, 1985.22 The IRS summons requested the return of the tapes and twelve additional documents which had been filed
and sealed in Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong and

which the clerk had refused to produce in response to the summons.2 8
The Church opposed the production of the tapes and sealed documents. 4 It claimed that the IRS was not seeking the documents in
good faith, that there was a lack of relevance and that the documents
were privileged because they contained confidential communications
between the Church and its attorneys. 5
The IRS argued that the Church could not claim attorney-client
privilege as to the tapes because they contained evidence that future
illegal conduct was being planned by the Church with the assistance of
its attorneys.2 6 The IRS requested that the district court listen to excerpts of the tapes to determine if the privilege could be invoked. 7 In
support of its request for in camera inspection of the tapes, the IRS
submitted a declaration of relevancy and a description of the contents

17.

Id.

18. Id. Included in the documentary materials were tape recorded conversations between
the Church of Scientology and its attorneys. The Church asserted that the attorneys were acting
in their professional capacity, that the communications were related to legal matters and that the
communications were confidential. Id. at 2624.
19. Id. at 2623.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.

22. Id. at 2623-24.
23.

Id.

24. Id. at 2624.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.

27. Id. The IRS declared that it obtained the partial transcripts from a confidential source
prior to the issuance of the summons. The Supreme Court adopted the position that the transcripts were legally obtained, in the absence of a finding of illegality by the District Court. Id.
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of the tapes obtained from interviews. 8 Additionally, the IRS provided
the court with partial transcripts of the tapes over the 'objections of the
Church."9
After oral argument and an evidentiary hearing, the district court
ruled that the IRS summons had not been made in bad faith but that
some of the communications were privileged." The Court ordered the
clerk to produce the non-privileged documentary materials but not the
privileged tapes.3 1 Based on the quoted excerpts from the tapes, the
district court determined that there was evidence of past crime or fraud
but no indication that future crime or fraud was being planned.3
The IRS moved for reconsideration, this time urging that the
Court listen to the tapes in their entirety. 3 The district court denied
the motion, stating that the IRS had not suggested at the hearing that
the partial transcripts of the tapes were inadequate in order to determine if the crime-fraud exception applied."
The Church appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that it was error for the court to rely on the partial
transcripts, because "[i]n this Circuit, a party cannot rely on the communications themselves-whether by listening to the tapes or reviewing
excerpts or transcripts of them."35 The IRS cross-appealed, claiming
that the district court erred in its finding that the crime-fraud exception did not apply to the tapes.3 6 Furthermore, the IRS contended that
the court should have listened to the tapes in their entirety before ruling that the crime-fraud exception was inapplicable.3 7
The Church argued that the district court erred merely by listening to the partial transcripts because the party challenging the privilege
must bear its burden by evidence independent of the contested communications themselves.3 8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the Church that the IRS must show evidence of crime or fraud
"independent of the attorney-client communications 'ecorded on the
tapes." 3 9 The court of appeals then reviewed the evidence proffered by

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2625 (quoting Cross-Appellee's Answering Brief and Appellant's Reply Brief).
Id. at 2624.
Id. at 2625.

Id.
809 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Id. (quoting United States v. Zolin,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/9
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the IRS, excluding review of the partial transcripts. 0 Based on its re-.
view of the independent evidence, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court decision that the IRS failed to carry its burden to establish the application of the crime-fraud exception."1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
two issues which had divided the courts of appeals.4 2 This casenote analyzes the Supreme Court's resolution on the issue regarding "whether
the applicability of the criime-fraud exception. must be established by"
evidence independent of the contested communications.4 More specifically, whether an in camera inspection which includes the content of
the contested materials should' be used to resolve disputes over applica-

tion of the exception."
III.

BACKGROUND

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
between a client and his attorney.45 The privilege is an important part
of our judicial system," created to encourage frank and full disclosure
between a client and his attorney.4 7 The earliest references to the attor-

ney-client privilege date to the mid-1600s. A counselor in Waldron v.
40. Id. The exclusion of the partial transcripts by the appellate court implied that in its
opinion the district court should not have looked at the partial transcripts because they were not
independent of the contested communications. Id.
41. Id. The panel of the court of appeals agreed with the Church's interpretation of United
States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.) (requiring independent evidence), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 944 (1972). The full court of appeals later vacated the panel .opinion and ordered en banc
review, noting an apparent conflict between Shewfelt and United'States v. Friedman,'445 F.2d
1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). The court "vacated the order for rehearing en
banc as improvidently granted and reinstated" the relevant part of the panel opinion, determining
that there was in fact no conflict because Friedman did not address the issue of independent
evidence. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2625.
42. Zolin, 109 S.Ct. at 2622. The second issue is whether the district court, when enforcing
an IRS summons, "may condition its enforcement order by placing restrictions on the disclosure
of the summoned information," under 26 U.S.C. § 7604. Id. at 2622-23. For further reference on
IRS summons power, see Nieman, IRS Summons Power: The Use of and Process for Criminal
Purposes, 11 CRIM. JUST. J. 125 (1988).
43. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2623.
44. Id.
45. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128
U.S. 464, 470 (1888); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1977); see also Gardner, supra
note 2, at 708; Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 1061, 1061-62 (1978).
46. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1972); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F. Supp. 197, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1983); see also.Note, The
Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: Marc Rich and the Second Circuit,
51 BROOKLYN L. REV.913, 915 (1985).
47. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (the Court stated that sound legal advice depends on the
lawyer being fully informed by the client); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290.
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Ward"8 was asked to testify as to his client's confidences regarding the
death of Sir Thomas Conye.49 The Roll Chief Justice stated that he
was "not bound to make answer for things which may disclose the
secrets of his client's cause, and thereupon he was forborn to be examined." 0 In Radcliffe v. Fursman," the defendant's counselor was
examined on his client's disclosure of the terms of a disputed annuity.
The House of Lords held that "no counsellor or attorney can be
obliged, or ought to discover any matter which his client reveals to
him.' 52 The privilege allows clients to obtain the aid of the lawyer's
skill and knowledge of the law, "which assistance can only be safely
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.""3 Nevertheless, the privilege should be used
sparingly because it withholds material information from the trier of
fact by throwing the cloak of privilege over the disputed evidence."
Recognizing the conflict between the privilege and the court's need for
relevant information, the courts have developed numerous exceptions in
order to limit the scope of the privilege.55 For instance a communication between attorney and client is not protected if it is not made in
confidence or if it is not made in the attorney's professional capacity. 6
esAmong the exceptions is the "crime-fraud exception" which is well
57
tablished in the case law and in the writings of legal scholars.
One of the earliest cases to utilize the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege is Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea,58 an English
case from 1743 in which the Earl of Anglesea paid his solicitor
£10,000 to prosecute his nephew on a trumped-up murder charge to
prevent the nephew from taking title to the Earldom of Anglesea.' 9 In
Annesley, The Barons of Exchequer held that there is no privilege for
communications with attorneys unless the communications were made

48. 82 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B. 1654).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 1 Eng. Rep. 1101 (H.L. 1730).
52. Id. at 1103.
53. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also United States v. Hedge &
Zwieg, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977) (the privilege is "central to the legal system and the
adversary process. For these reasons, the privilege may deserve unique protection in the courts").
54. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also Note, supra note 4, at 730.
55. See Hazard, supra note 45, at 1061.
56. Note, supra note 4, at 730.
57. See O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] App. Cas. 581, 596; see also S. GARD, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 21:18 (1972); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 4, § 213; 8 J.WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2298.

58.

17

59.

Id.

HOWELLS STATE TRIALS

1139 (1743).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/9
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to obtain legal counsel.60 In 1884 the Queen's Bench, laid further foundation for the exception in Regina v. Cox,"1 in which a solicitor aided
Cox in a fraudulent stock transfer to avoid a judgment creditor." The
judges in Cox 68 held that the attorney-client privilege ceases to exist if
a client seeks an attorney's aid in the commission of a crime or fraud
because it is not the solicitor's professional business to further any
criminal plan so there is no professional relationship between the attorney and the client in this circumstance. 6 '
These early cases confine the.crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to violations of criminal law. However, later cases
also apply the exception to civil as well as criminal circumstances. In
O'Rourke v. Darbishire,e5 the English House of Lords stated that professional privilege does not attach to communications made for the purpose of carrying out a civil fraud."6 The defendant Darbishire, was both
trustee and solicitor for a trust created to defraud the testator's legal
heirs of their rights. 7 The heirs brought a civil action against
Darbishire and his co-trustees. 8
The rule in Cox was espoused by courts in the United States in
1886.9 In Orman v. State,0 the defendant learned from his attorney
that there was a statute which would reduce the penalty from murder
to manslaughter if the decedent first insulted the defendant's female
relatives.7 1 The defendant shot the man who insulted his mother and
sister.7 The court determined that the conversation between the defendant and his attorney was admissible, citing Cox, because it was
made in furtherance of a crime.73
In 1891, tle Cox rule was approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Alexander v. United States.7 ' Alexander was involved in a
business venture when, unexpectedly, his partner disappeared.75 Alexander consulted his attorney to determine whether he could keep his

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884).
Id.
Id.
Id.
[1920] App. Cas. 581 (applying the exception in a title dispute).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Orman v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 604, 616-17, 3 S.W. 468, 471-72 (1886).
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id. at 471.
138 U.S. 353 (1891).
Id. at 355.
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missing partner's horses in exchange for the partnership funds which
Alexander claimed his partner had taken with him." Alexander was
later tried for the murder of his partner and the trial court admitted
into evidence Alexander's conversation with his attorney to impeach
Alexander's statements about his partner's disappearance." The Supreme Court held that admitting the attorney's testimony was error78
because the communication was not in furtherance of the murder.
The Court cited Cox for the proposition that communication with an
attorney in furtherance of a crime is not entitled to the privilege, but
distinguished it because Alexander's communication with his attorney
the crime had been committed.79
occurred
The after
application of the crime-fraud exception to cases of crime as
8
well as civil frauds is similarly well established in the United States. "
It is important to note from the history briefly outlined above that the
exception is purely an invention of the common law. It has been, and
81
continues to be, in a constant state of development in the courts.
The purpose of the crime-fraud exception is generally to prevent
the attorney-client privilege from shielding from prosecution the client
who uses his attorney's advice to initiate or continue a fraudulent or
criminal activity.8 2 There are several scenarios where the crime-fraud
83
exception may apply: conspiracy between the attorney and client; solicitation of illegal assistance which the attorney declines;" performance of legal services without the attorney knowing of the client's tortious or criminal purpose; 85 and later appropriation to an illegal end of

76. Id. at 358.
77. Id. at 357-58.
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. at 358-59.
80. See, e.g., Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972) (the court held that the exception
operates in a civil anti-trust action); Kockums Indus. v. Salem Equip., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 168 (D.
Or. 1983) (the court applied the exception in a patent infringement action); Caldwell y. District
Court, 644 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1982) (the court applied the exception in a personal injury action); see
,-also Gardner, supra note 2, at 709; Fried, supra note 3, at 447-61.
See also Fried, supra note 3, at 445-46; Stern & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1786-89.
.81.
82. See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2298 ("But these reasons all cease to operate at a
certain point,, namely, where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future
wrongdoing. From that point onwards, no protection is called for by any of these
considerations.").
I 83. See, e.g., SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D. D.C. 1948) (attorney and client conspired together to relieve client's corporation from the obligations of an underwriting agreement).
84. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.) (An alderman, serving a prison
sentence for accepting bribes on other occasions, offered to commit perjury in a subsequent bribery case if the attorney would get the remaining charges against him dropped; attorney refused.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956).
. 85. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Stanley, 241 Ala. 39, 1 So.2d 21 (1941) (attorney was unaware that
his clients sought his counsel for the purpose of forging a will).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/9
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legal services originally obtained for a lawful purpose.86
The procedural application of the exception has also been gradually developed by the courts.87 Three procedural areas of controversy
have divided the courts: 1) whether the trial court may review the privileged communications in camera to determine if the crime-fraud exception applies; 2) whether some threshold of evidence is needed before
the trial court may undertake the requested review; and 3) if a threshold showing is required, what type of evidence may the party challenging the privilege use to meet that threshold. 8
Courts have traditionally required a prima facie showing of crime
or fraud to overcome the attorney-client privilege.89 In Clark v. United
States,90 Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, stated that, in order to overcome the privilege, there must be "a
showing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the
'91 revealing the
light should be let in,
otherwise privileged communication. Many courts have, until recently, cited Clark with approval. 9 2

86. See. e.g., Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 340 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1960) (insured altered his claim upon advice from his attorneys that he had no claim against his insurance
company because of a suspension provision in the policy).
87. Gardner, supra note 2, at 709.
88. United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (interim ed. 1989); see also Gardner,
supra note 2, at 710 (recognizing three problems of proof: "(1) the quantum of proof required; (2)
the kind of proof which is satisfactory; and (3) a new possibility of preliminary disclosure which
has been raised").
89. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (determining that "the.
government must first make a prima facie showing of a violation sufficiently serious to defeat the
privilege, and second, establish some relationship between the communication at issue and the
prima facie violation") (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984) (defining a prima facie showing as a "reasonable basis for believing the objective of the communication was fraudulent"); In re Berkley &
Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (requiring a prima facie showing); In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring a prima facie showing); In re September 1975 Grand
Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1976) (comparing "adequate reason" to prima facie
evidence); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972) (requiring "sufficient evidence
to sustain a finding that the challenged communications were made in furtherance of a crime or
tort"); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1967) (withdrawing privilege
upon a prima facie showing); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.) (declaring that
"there must ... be first established a prima facie case . . .mere assertion of an intended crime
or fraud is not enough to release the attorney") (citations omitted), cert. denied. 308 U.S. 589
(1939); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F. Supp. 197, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (requiring
a prima facie showing); see also S. GARD, supra note 57, § 21:18 ("the mere suggestion of fraud
does not afford sufficient ground for setting aside the general rule"); S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN,
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.65 (1983) ("it is settled that the privilege may not be overcome by a
mere allegation of wrongdoing"); Gardner, supra note 2, at 710.
90. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
91. Id. at 14.
92. See, e.g., Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1967); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 18, 1981, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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However, in the last few years, some courts have required only a "foundation in fact" to overcome the constraints of the privilege because of
the difficulty inherent in proving crime or fraud in communications
which are confidential. 98 The Supreme Court in Zolin adopted the
"foundation in fact" standard.9 4
In camera review is generally defined as the inspection of evidence,
in a trial judge's chambers, which counsel wishes to offer at trial, sub9
ject to a ruling on its admissability. 5 The use of in camera review is
well established in the federal courts. 96 Zolin and other courts have,
however, recognized inherent dangers in excessive use of in camera review, including violation of due process rights and erosion of the confi97
dentiality of attorney-client communications.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has described in
camera proceedings as "extraordinary events in the constitutional
framework because they deprive the parties against whom they are directed of the root requirements of due process, i.e. notice setting forth
the alleged misconduct with particularity and an opportunity for a
hearing. They can only be justified and allowed by compelling state
interests." Furthermore, in some circumstances, in camera proceedings may also deny the party against whom they are directed his sixth
amendment right to effective legal counsel by forcing his attorney to
99
reveal both his confidences as well as his trial strategy.

93. See, e.g., Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222
(Colo. 1982) (requiring a "foundation in fact" in an action brought to enjoin use of materials
seized from law offices); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 32 (Colo. 1982) (distinguishing
"some foundation in fact" from a prima facie showing of crime or fraud).
94. 109 S. Ct. at 2631.
95. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
96. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); In re Impounded
Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155 (6th
Cir. 1986); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 722
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Witness,
695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Berkley
& Co., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); Caldwell v. District.Court, 644 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1982);
United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
97. 109 S. Ct. at 2630; see, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) ("[t]oo
much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege
"); United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983); In re John
was meant to protect ....
Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing the need to respect the confidentiality of
communications between clients and their attorneys); In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury
(1I), 640 F.2d 49, 56-57 (7th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that in camera submissions may violate due
process rights); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (parties may be deprived of
due process rights).
98. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d1183, 1187-88 (2d Ci'. 1977) (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 950 (1974); see also, Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal
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The preservation of grand jury secrecy is a compelling state interest which may justify the intrusive effect of in camera review. 100 Additionally, because of the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, the intrusive effects of disclosure are minimized. 1' 1 However, an increase in
prosecutions of white-collar crimes has caused a proliferation in the use
of in camera review in civil trials as well as in grand jury proceedings.102 While grand jury secrecy may justify in camera review, these
considerations are not present at the trial level.'
The increased use of in camera review, particularly where no
threshold evidence is required independent of the contested communication itself, has created concern that allegations of crime or fraud may
be misused to go on a "fishing expedition" through opposing counsel's
files.'0 Even a good faith use of the crime-fraud exception may cause
adverse effects. For example, it may undercut the attorney-client privilege by compelling an attorney to give evidence against his client; it
may 6reate a conflict of interest because the attorney's personal interests may be in conflict with those of his client; and it may force withdrawal of counsel at a time of crucial importance to the client's
defense.' 05
The pernicious effects of in camera review are particularly troublesome where the party alleging crime or fraud has no independent evidence to justify his allegation. Thus, if the attorney-client communicafor Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 95, 101-02 (1985).
100. Note, supra note 46, at 919.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 80; see also Fried, supra note 3, at 445. Fried attributes the increase in white-collar crime prosecutions to the complexities of modern administrative
regulation, occasioning a growth in federal criminal law. Fried also decries the trend of administrative agencies to demand the confidential communications of attorneys in the course of civil
investigations. Id.
103. Note, supra note 46, at 918-19.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (party claiming privilege was forced to open the documents for the court's inspection without any independent prima
facie showing of crime or fraud); United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2dCir. 1940)
(Judge Learned Hand recognized "the paradox of disclosing the very evidence intended to be
suppressed in order to prove the existence of the privilege."); see also Fried, supra note 3, at 467.
Some courts, however, have endorsed the substitution of inspection by the judge for the
safeguard of requiring independent evidence of fraud. When courts follow this procedure,
the plaintiff may first induce the court to read the defendant's confidential communications
on an unsupported charge of crime or fraud; the prima facie case needed to justify their
introduction into evidence is then constructed out of the communications themselves.
Id. (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 674 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1982) (An attorney's
conflict of interest arose upon receipt of a grand jury subpoena and counsel told the court that he
wanted to appear to clear his name.); see also In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
United States Y. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Fried, supra note 3, at 475-77, 490-98;
Weiner, supra note 99, at 91-94.
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tions are exposed before the court on the mere allegation of crime or
fraud, the potential damage to the attorney-client relationship has already been inflicted even if the communications were, in fact, entirely
innocent.'" A requirement of independent evidence serves to protect
attorney-client relationships which are innocent while at the same time
preventing the misuse of the privilege where the attorney's advice is
used to commit a crime or fraud.
The issue of independent evidence has been a subject of controversy among legal commentators. Dean Wigmore has taken the following position:
the attorney may be the link without whose testimony the conspiracy or
some part of its development cannot be evidenced . . . [T] he solution
can perhaps be reached by a ruling on the burden of proof. Where there
is some evidence of crime or fraud apart from the communications with
the attorney, and there have been transactions with him, let the burden
be on the attorney to satisfy the court

. . .

that the transaction has to his

107
best belief not been wrongful, before the claim of privilege is allowed.
Wigmore's approach would serve to weed out fraudulent or criminal
communications from innocent communications, before in camera review is conducted.

108 the Ninth Circuit Court of ApIn United States v. Shewfelt,

peals required that "[blefore the privileged status of these communicafacie
tions can be lifted, the government must first establish a prima
10 9 Under
communications."
said
case of fraud independently of the
Shewfelt, evidence of crime or fraud has to come from sources independent of the attorney-client communications themselves, thus affording
some protection to the privilege.110 In recent years, the courts have rejected the "independency" test set forth in Shewfelt in favor of reconciling the "competing claims of confidentiality and disclosure by in
106. See Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 412 (1927) (The authors liken the tardy vindication of

privileges to "an instance of locking the garage door after the automobile has been stolen.").
107. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,§ 2299 (emphasis added); see also S. GARD, supra note
57, § 21:18 ("There should be some independent proof of wrongful purpose; the mere suggestion
of fraud does not afford sufficient ground for setting aside the general rule."); S. SALTZBURG .& K.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 359 (4th ed. 1986).
The common law rule is not that the Trial Judge should examine documents when a claim
of attorney-client privilege is made; the Trial Judge must first determine that the government has made a primafacie case that the privilege does not apply because the communication was in furtherance of a crime or fraud. Only then should the Trial Judge look at the
documents.
Id.
108. 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
109. Id. at 840.
110. Id.
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camera review of the disputed evidence." 1" Courts and legal scholars
critical of the Shewfelt "independency" test consider it an unwarranted
obstruction because it makes it more difficult to prove that crime or
fraud occurred. 112 In recognition of the significant proof problems facing the exception, some courts and commentators have encouraged a
less stringent requirement, allowing the privilege to be defeated by evidence which is not independent of the privileged communication
3
itself.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In United States v. Zolin,"4 the United States Supreme Court had

an opportunity to examine the three primary problems of proof created
by the crime-fraud exception. The Court's treatment of these problems,
and, in particular, its rejection of the -independent evidence requirement, are the subject of this analysis. Additionally, the impact of the
Zolin decision on the attorney-client privilege will be examined.
A.

The Problems of Proof

Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court in Zolin,
identified the three evidentiary questions: 1) whether a district court
may review the arguably privileged communications in camera at the
behest of the party opposing the privilege to determine if the crimefraud exception is applicable; 2) whether some threshold evidentiary
showing is required before the district court may commence the requested review; and 3) if a threshold showing is needed, the kind of
evidence the opposing party may use to meet it." 5

111. See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (prima facie evidence does not have to be independent evidence); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 262
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (declaring that the Shewfelt "independency" test is no longer law in the Ninth
Circuit); see also Fried, supra note 3, at 461-62.
112. See, e.g., In re Berkley, 629 F.2d at 553 n.9 ("[the cases relied on in Shewfelt. . . do
not support the independent evidence restriction"); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. at 262
(citing United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971)
and United States v. Hedge & Zwieg, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) in support of its assertion
that Shewfelt is no longer law in the Ninth Circuit); see also 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 4, § 213 (describing in camera disclosure of the disputed communication as "necessary
in order to administer the exception sensibly"); Fried, supra note 3, at 464.
113. See, e.g., United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. at 262 (usually the only evidence of the
crime is the conversation itself); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982) (approving an intermediate burden of proof in recognition of significant problems in proving the exception); see also, Fried, supra note 3, at 465-67.
114. 109 S. Ct. 2619 (interim ed. 1989).
115. Id. at 2627.
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1. In Camera Review
116 and 1101(c)"1 ' of the
The Zolin Court examined Rules 104(a)
Federal Rules of Evidence and determined that, on their face, the
Rules seem to indicate that the judge must honor claims of privilege in
8
making a preliminary fact determination.' However, as many scholars
have noted,1 1 9 this interpretation of the Rules would lead to an absurd
result; if a judge strictly honors a claim of privilege it may prohibit the
entrance into evidence of the only material available to prove crime or
2
fraud, the attorney-client communication itself.
Rejecting such an interpretation as "draconian", the Zolin Court
looked instead to the federal common law of privilege for clarification."' Since the concepts of privilege and exception are the inventions
of the common law, they are constantly being changed and modified by
the courts. 22 Frequently, changes to common law doctrine are in response to exigent circumstances which exert pressure on the courts.
The increase in prosecutions of white collar crimes, is an exigent cir23
cumstance which has placed an extraordinary burden on the courts.
Concurrently, the Justice Department has recently recognized the util4 As a conseity of the attorney subpoena in criminal investigations.
quence, the courts are more frequently called upon to resolve evidentiary questions in which the parties dispute whether certain evidence is
privileged or not.12 5 Evidentiary questions of privilege are difficult and
time-consuming, prompting more and more courts to sidestep the issues
12 6
of proof by employing in camera review.
Justice Blackmun's opinion cites numerous federal court opinions
which have adopted the practice of in camera review in cases similar to
Zolin.127 Many courts have turned to this procedure because of over-

116. Rule 104(a) provides: "[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court . . . . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges." FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
117. Rule 1101(c) provides: "[t]he rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all
actions, cases, and proceedings." FED. R. EVID. 1 101(C).
118. 109 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
119. See, e.g., 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5055
(1977).
120. Id.
121. 109 S. Ct. at 2628.
122. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
123. See Fried, supra note 3, at 445.
124. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1787.
125. See Fried, supra note 3, at 445.
126. Id. at 467.
127. 109 S. Ct. at 2629.
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crowded dockets. 128 In camera review can summarily determine
whether the disputed materials should be admitted into evidence.'2 9
The Zolin Court stated that "a per se rule that the communications in
question may never be considered creates, we feel, too great an impediment to the proper functioning of the adversary process."130 The Court

may thus have sacrificed the privilege in favor of efficiency.
2. Threshold Evidence

The Court then turned to the question of whether a threshold
showing of crime or fraud is required before in camera review can be
undertaken. It determined that a threshold evidentiary showing is required before the evidence is inspected in camera.' The Court recognized that the blanket use of in camera review raises due process concerns, 3 2 particularly when no threshold showing is a prerequisite to the
in camera inspection.' 3 The Court also recognized the possible misuse
of the exception to allow "fishing expeditions" through opposing counsel's records. 3

Given these concerns, one would expect the Court to require a
higher burden of proof than a mere foundation in fact of crime or
fraud. Surprisingly, the Court lowered the burden of proof necessary to
trigger.in camera review." 5 The Court approved the standard utilized
in Caldwell v. District Court. 36 In Caldwell, the Colorado Supreme

Court required a "factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief
by a reasonable person""' 7 that in camera review will establish that the
crime-fraud exception applies. The Zolin Court approved this lower
standard as striking the correct balance between the privilege and the
exception. The Court stated that the threshold evidentiary requirement
need not be stringent." 8
It is puzzling that the Court would approve a lower burden of
proof following its recognition of the problems inherent in routine use
of in camera review, the risk of unnecessary disclosure, "fishing expeditions" through opposing counsel's records, due process implications,

128.
129.

Fried, supra note 3, at 467-76.
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 119,
130. .109 S. Ct. at 2629.
131. Id. at 2630.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 2631.
136. Id.
137. 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982).
138. 109 S. Ct. at 2631.
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1 9
and the burden on trial courts. " A lowered burden of proof simply
makes it easier for the opponent of the privilege to prove crime or fraud
and to trigger in camera review.
Lowering the burden of proof allows the party opposing the privilege to have access to the attorney-client communications with a minimal showing of evidence to warrant it. Consequently, confidential communications are exposed to the judge and possibly to opposing counsel.
This is less of a concern where inspection, in fact, results in evidence to
support the allegation of crime or fraud. However, innocent communications between an attorney and client may also be exposed to the
judge and to opposing counsel. Opposing counsel may be able to obtain
information, such as the names of witnesses previously unknown to
him, from the attorney's private files. Additionally, damaging information unrelated to the issues of the case may adversely influence a client's case. A higher burden of proof would better address the policy
concerns raised by the routine use of in camera review.

3.

Independent Evidence

Finally, the Court examined whether independent evidence is rean in
quired before the district court has the discretion to undertake
4 The Court
camera review of an allegedly privileged communication.
to the
defined "independent evidence" as evidence "without ' reference
14
in
issue
At
content of the contested communications themselves.
Zolin was whether the IRS could use the partial transcripts in support
142 The Court determined that the
of its petition for in camera review.
threshold could be met by any relevant, evidence,4 whether or not it was
On its face, Rule
independent of the contested communication.
104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence would prohibit the IRS from
reusing the partial transcripts in support of its request for in camera
14
In
communications."
view if they had been found to be privileged
of
nature
Zolin, the district court made no ruling as to the privileged
14 The Court reasoned that the partial tranthe partial transcripts.
scripts could be used by the IRS in support of its request for in camera
146 Because the partial tapes make
review of the tapes in their entirety.
reference to the contents of the contested communications themselves,

139. Id. at 2630.
140. Id. at 2631.
141. Id. at 2623.
142. Id. at 2631.
143. Id. at 2632.
144. Id. at 2631.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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they are not independent evidence. 147 The Court went on to observe

that evidence reflecting the content of the disputed documents is usu-

ally strong evidence of the content of the documents themselves. 1 8 Allowing district courts to review evidence that is not independent would
enable the courts to quickly and efficiently resolve any evidentiary
issue. 19
The Church of Scientology in Zolin argued that if non-independent evidence is allowed it would encourage litigants to obtain confidential information about attorney-client communications through illegal or suspect means. 150 The Court dismissed this argument as
insufficient to exclude such material from consideration.'5 1
B.

Impact on Attorney-Client Privilege

Although the Court considered the underlying policy concerns supporting the attorney-client privilege, it failed to give them adequate
consideration when it reduced the evidentiary burden on parties who
raise the crime-fraud exception. The court lowered the evidentiary burden, allowing opposing counsel to have access to confidential communications absent independent evidence of crime or fraud. The attorneyclient privilege serves to encourage clients to fully disclose to their attorney the facts of their case and thereby to obtain the attorney's advice. 52 By allowing opposing counsel, with minimal evidence, to force
the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications, the client's confidence in his attorney is undermined. 53 Clients would naturally be reluctant to be frank with their attorney if they knew that their
attorney might later be called upon to testify as to their confidential
communications, particularly in grand jury hearings where the attorney
must testify in secret. 154 In cases in which an attorney is forced to defend himself against allegations of crime or fraud, the attorney's interests come in conflict with those of his client. Such a conflict may force
opposing counsel to withdraw- from his client's case because of the attorney's ethical obligation to preserve the confidences of his client.' 55

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2632.
Id.

151. Id. The Court stated, "[w]e think that deterring the aggressive pursuit of relevant
information from third-party sources is not sufficiently central to the policies of the attorney-client
privilege to require us to adopt the exclusionary rule urged by respondents." Id.
152. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
2290.
153. See Weiner, supra note 99, at 99.
154. See id. at 102-03.
155. See id. at 105.
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CONCLUSION

The scope of the crime-fraud exception is being gradually expanded by the increased use of in camera review, lowered thresholds of
evidence and the rejection of the independent evidence requirement.
Additionally, the exception is increasingly being exercised in a proliferation of white-collar prosecutions under federal criminal law. The expansion of the crime-fraud exception threatens the attorney-client privilege and undermines the purpose of the privilege: to allow clients to
obtain effective legal counsel by encouraging full and frank disclosure
between the client and his attorney. The erosion of the procedural obstacles to the crime-fraud exception may also infringe on constitutional
guarantees of due process and effective legal counsel. While the United
States Supreme Court in Zolin gave passing recognition to these considerations, the Court nevertheless significantly contributed to the
emasculation of the attorney-client privilege.
Rachel A. Hutzel
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